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(Aus)
Who: [redacted] (b)(6) 1 KDK Badder Tolay, ANAOA. Debrief on 07 Aug 14

What: GoB Incident on 05 Aug – Information

Why: (b)(6) reported the following information, gained through unknown contacts, to his mentor on 07 Aug.

An UKN GSU soldier had informed Rafiqullah, the perpetrator of the GoB incident, of when the MFNDU project board visit would be taking place and the areas they would be (Comment: it is unknown how much detail or from where this information was received). At this stage Rafiqullah was based on the ridgeline (NFDK) and requested he was moved to the GSU building the day before the visit, no reason was reportedly given but Rafiqullah's request was granted.

On 05 Aug the GSU Company Commander ordered that all weapons be handed in, however, Rafiqullah retained his weapon claiming it needed to be cleaned.

No further details are known at this stage.

No source corroboration has taken place to verify the information. Will attempt to substantiate report with Afghan G2 elements.

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Marshal Fahim National Defense University

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia-

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshal_Fahim_National_Defense_University

Jump to: [navigation](#), [search](#)

Coordinates: 34°32′24″N 69°04′12″E﻿ / ﻿34.540°N 69.070°E﻿ / 34.540; 69.070

The **Marshal Fahim National Defense University** is located in the [Qargha](#) (or Qargheh) district of [Kabul](#) on a 105-acre site on a plateau to the west of the centre of Kabul city near Police District 5.

There are three distinct parts to the university:

- the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA),
- the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA), and
- the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy, which includes the Sergeant Major Academy.

The site also houses the ANA Foreign Language Institute.

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History of the Military Site at Qargha[\[edit\]](#)

Geography The key to Qargha's historical importance is its geographical position. Qargha lies at the western extremity of Kabul, a low plateau dominated to the north and west by a crescent shaped range of hills. Even to the untrained eye, its strategic significance is obvious. To the south west the pass leading to Wardak, Ghazni and Kandahar forms a deep V shape cut into the mountains; to the west lie the Paghman mountains, the Paghman plateau and the road leading into the Hazarat; and to the north, beyond the ridge, the Kabul valley extends to Bagram, Charikor and the passes at Parwan and into the Panjshir Valley.

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Ancient History The valley in which the university is situated has witnessed the passage of Afghanistan's invaders throughout recorded history, from Alexander the Great in 326BC to Genghis Khan in 1222AD, followed by Tamerlane (Timur) in 1380 and Babur in 1504. On three separate occasions three hundred years later, the shepherds grazing their flocks on the hillsides would have seen the British advancing up the valley from the East, Robert Sale in 1839, George Pollock in 1842 and Frederick Roberts in 1879.

Modern History - The Royal Period The modern history of Qargha begins in the early 1880s, when Abdur Rahman Khan, the founder of the regular Afghan Army, established a logistics base in Qargha to sustain his operations in the Hazarajat region. The camp was expanded considerably during the reign of Abdur Rahman's grandson, Emir Amānullāh Khān in the 1920s when he invited advisors from the Turkish and German Armies to train his Army in order to assert his newly won independence from British control. It became the home of the Kabul Division which was essentially the Emir's strategic reserve. The camp performed this function until the time of the Soviet occupation in 1979.

Modern History – The Soviet Period The Soviet occupation of Qargha began in 1980. They too used the site as a logistics depot, digging ordnance storage bunkers into the northern hillside of the camp, many of which are still in use by the ANA. By the mid-1980s Qargha was occupied by around 12,000 troops, about half Soviet and half Afghan. Despite the huge number of troops on the site, the Mujahideen succeeded in launching an audacious infiltration attack which destroyed a large part of the ordnance depot with a spectacular explosion which could be heard across Kabul city. The attack caused several months of disruption to Soviet supply lines as they struggled to rebuild the depot.

Modern History – The Massoud Period The decision of Abdul Rashid Dostum to move his Jowzjani militia out of Qargha to join Ahmad Shah Massoud's coalition of warlords in the north and North East of the country contributed to the downfall of Mohammad Najibullah's government. Massoud sited a number of Mujahideen troops at Qargha, and he was a frequent visitor to the site, staying in the commander's white house on the hillside, which is now known as 'Massoud House'.

Modern History – The Taliban Period Massoud's forces pulled out of Qargha in 1996. The installations left over from the Royal Army and Soviet periods made it an ideal site for the Taliban, who moved in and used it as a training and ordnance depot. They were still in occupation when American bombs rained down in during the Post 9/11 offensive in October 2001, obliterating most of the buildings. ^[1]

Qargha Today[[edit](#)]

Qargha remained a bombed-out moonscape until the decision was made to make it the site of the Afghan National Defence University. American contractors moved in in 2009 to clear the site, destroying old ordnance and bulldozing the rusting hulks of Soviet vehicles into huge scrap heaps.

When building work was completed, the Qargha site centralised the training of the majority of future officers and non-commissioned officers in the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA Officer training previously took place at both the ANDU site and east of the city at the Kabul Military Training Center. NMAA before that was located to the north of the city close to the Kabul International Airport but moved to the ANDU site in 2012.^[2]

In April 2014, the university was renamed the Defence University of Marshall Fahim in honour of the former Vice President of Afghanistan, Mohammed Fahim who died of a heart attack on 9 March 2014. The ANDU has been commanded by Major General Jalinda Shah since May 2014.

National Military Academy [\[edit\]](#)

The National Military Academy of Afghanistan is modelled on the United States Military Academy (known as West Point). It is designed to train cadets to produce well-educated and professional officers for each of the disciplines of the ANA. Schools include Armor, Artillery, Human Resources, Signal, Infantry, Engineer, Legal, Military Police, Logistics, Religious/Cultural Affairs, Intelligence and Finance.^[3]

NMAA moved to the ANDU site in Qargha on completion of its new campus in 2012. It was previously located in the old Air Academy established by the Soviet Union to the north of Kabul beside Kabul International Airport.

NMAA cadets study both military and academic subjects for a total of 4 years and are awarded a degree from ANDU before commissioning into the ANA as Second Lieutenants. Female cadets have studied at the NMAA since 2011 and the first intake of NMAA-trained female officers will graduate in 2015.

Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) [\[edit\]](#)

The ANA Officer Academy is also referred to in Afghanistan as ANAOA, The 'Sandhurst' Academy and the Junior Officer Academy. It was reported as early as 2006 that the United Kingdom would take a primary role in the creation of an Officer Academy for the ANA. Nicknamed "Sandhurst in the Sand", the Academy was to be modelled on the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. This was supported by the then-head of the ANA, General Sher Mohammad Karimi, who attended Sandhurst himself in the 1960s.^[4]

On 29 March 2012 UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond met Afghan General Abdul Rahim Wardak and signed a statement of intent on developing the academy. The UK undertook to provide approximately 75% of the training staff for the Academy and indicated it would be involved in its running long after the 2014 deadline for pulling out the majority of troops.^[5] Afghan officer cadets have been undertaking training at Sandhurst in recent years in order to improve the standard of officers in the ANA.

On 19 July 2012 on a visit to Kabul the British Prime Minister David Cameron signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the UK to provide mentors and advisors to the Afghan

National Army Officer Academy.^[6] New Zealand will also contribute support to the ANA Officer Academy.^[7]

Located in the Qargha area of Kabul, the first concrete steps were taken 10 Oct 2012 to start the construction of the academy with a ground-breaking ceremony attended by a number of dignitaries including the ANA Chief of General Staff General Shir Mohammad Karimi, the Her Majesty's Ambassador to Afghanistan Sir Richard Stagg, ISAF Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw and Commander of the NATO Training Mission (NTM-A) Lt Gen Bolger.^{[8][9]}

The ANA Officer Academy accepted its first intake of 270 students selected from approximately 10,000 initial applicants in October 2013. Training is being delivered by a staff of Afghan officers and soldiers in cooperation with a team of mentors from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and Norway.^{[10][11]}

The ANA Officer Academy started recruiting its first intake of women in February 2014. Female staff receive instructor training with their male colleagues, and they are mentored by a coalition female mentoring team. Female candidates attended a two-day selection test on the Qargha site in April 2014 and a platoon (balook) of 30 female officer cadets started training alongside the third male intake in June 2014.^[12]

Sergeant Major Academy [\[edit\]](#)

The Sergeant Major Academy is currently part of the Kabul Military Training Centre. It trains male and female soldiers at the rank of E7 [staff sergeant](#) in order to prepare them for service as Sergeant Majors at the ranks of E8 and E9 in the ANA. The Academy will move to the ANDU site in Qargha on completion of the Phase 2 build project.

Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy [\[edit\]](#)

The Non-Commissioned Officer Academy undertakes training of soldiers from all disciplines up to the level of [staff sergeant](#).

Defence Institute of Foreign Languages [\[edit\]](#)

The Institute deliver training in Foreign Languages for individuals posted into defence diplomacy billets.

August 2014 shooting [\[edit\]](#)

Marshal Fahim National Defense University received unwelcome publicity on 5 August 2014, when a gunman believed to be an Afghan soldier opened fire on international military personnel at the facility, killing a U.S. general and wounding 15 officers and soldiers including a German brigadier general and eight U.S. troops.^[13]

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http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/af_mfndu.html



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Description

The current organization of the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) has been developed by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The Afghan National Defense University (ANDU) is the cornerstone of this, and it is based in Kabul. It has now been officially named MFNDU (Marshal Fahim National Defense University), in honor of Mohammad Qasim Fahim (an Afghan military commander, politician and the First Vice President of Afghanistan from November 2009 until his death in March 2014. Fahim became an honorary "Marshall" in 2004).

Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10152452837434553.1073741938.267816944552&>

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There are three distinct parts to the university:

1. National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA): The National Military Academy of Afghanistan is modelled on the United States Military Academy (known as West Point). It is designed to train cadets to produce well-educated and professional officers for each of the disciplines of the ANA. Schools include (in no particular order):

- 1.1 National Military Academy Armor School
- 1.2 National Military Academy Artillery School (opened in October 2010)
- 1.3 National Military Academy Human Resources
- 1.4 Signal National Military Academy Signal School (opened in 2010)
- 1.5 National Military Academy Infantry School
- 1.6 National Military Academy Engineer School
- 1.7 National Military Academy Legal School
- 1.8 National Military Academy Military Police School
- 1.9 National Military Academy Logistics School
- 1.10 National Military Academy Religious/Cultural Affairs
- 1.11 National Military Academy Intelligence
- 1.12 National Military Academy Finance

2. Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA)

3. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy: which includes

3.1 Sergeant Major Academy

Sources: <http://ntm-a.com/about-ntm-a>

http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/10/documents/Backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/cornerstone-laid-for-afghan-defense-university.html>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Training_Mission-Afghanistan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Military_Academy_of_Afghanistan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Defense_University#Afghan_National_Army_Officer_Academy_28ANAOA.29

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Defense_University

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Security_Transition_Command_-_Afghanistan

There are a set of several pictures showing the different School flags:

- <http://mod.gov.af/Content/Media/Pictures/Big/thb-26112012134814141553325325.jpg>

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- http://mod.gov.af/Content/Media/Pictures/Big/thb-DSC_0092151220121250120553325325.jpg

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(source: <http://mod.gov.af/en/ImageGallery>)

- <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/NewMilitaryAcademyAfghanistan.jpg>

(source: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/cornerstone-laid-for-afghan-defense-university.html>)

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Esteban Rivera, 24 June 2014

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Patient No.	Nationality	Time In	Injury sustained	Treatment prior to arrival MTF	CAT	Treatment in MTF	Transport to HLS	Treatment at HLS	Method of CASEVAC	Time of CASEVAC	Destination	Outcome
1												
2												
3												
4												
5												
6												
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(b)(6)

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Summary Statement of Events That Occurred on the 5th of August 2014-08-15

Written by [redacted] (9)(q) **Qargha**

1205	Pt 1 brought in by Maj General Bathus, he informed us that more casualties were on route [redacted] (9)(q) went to EFI to get the medics who were on their break. [redacted] (9)(q) went to REME to inform them that a Major incident had occurred and that they were needed at the medical centre to fulfil there roles. [redacted] (9)(q) phoned the Ops room to inform them of inbound casualties. Treatment was started on patient 1 by myself.
1207	Pt 2,3,4,5,6 were brought to the medical treatment facility (MTF) by varying means but mostly in 4x4 vehicles. [redacted] (9)(q) phoned Ops requesting air evacuation and confirmed the presence of CAT A casualties.
1208	Pt 7, Pt 8 brought to the MTF. REME and AQ arrive who provided patient tracking, security and control within the medical centre. At this point my attentions were taken up by the patient that I was treating. Due to the multiple gunshot wounds that he had received all my attention was taken up treating him. I was assisted by a combat medical technician.
1209	Pts 9, 10 and 11 brought to Medical facility.
1210	Pt 12 brought to MTF
1212	Pt 13 brought to MTF
1218	Pt 14 brought to MTF
1220	Pt 15 brought to MTF.
1225	[redacted] (9)(q) take pt 3 to HLS on Ridgeback. At this point I handed my patient over to [redacted] (9)(q) so that he could be taken to the HLS. I left the treatment room and was approached my Maj General Bathus, Brigadier Russell and an American senior officer who asked whether Maj General Green had been treated in the MTF. I reported that he had not.
1227	[redacted] (9)(q) and pt 2 to HLS on quad [redacted] (9)(q) and pt 7 to HLS on quad
1230	Pt 16 at MTF
1232	[redacted] (9)(q) and Pt 8 on quad to HLS Pt 11 with Danish Medic on quad to HLS [redacted] (9)(q) and pt 13 on Ridgeback to HLS
1235	During this time I helped to manage and treat the CAT C patients, assumed command and control of the medical centre to ensure that the trauma room was prepared for the possible admission of more CAT A patients.
1322	[redacted] (9)(q) (8)(q) and pts 1,4,6,12,14 return to MTF in Bushmaster
1325	[redacted] (9)(q) return to MTF on Quad
1330	[redacted] (9)(q) and pts 1,4,6,12,14 return to HLS in Bushmaster, informed helicopter in 20 minutes
1400	Ops room call MTF to inform of change of plan to road move to KAIA R2e
1410	[redacted] (9)(q) informed to join road move
1420	[redacted] (9)(q) joined Bushmasters at NEP reorganisation of patients: pts 1, 13 in and [redacted] (9)(q) in one Busmaster pts 4,6,14 and [redacted] (9)(q) in the other Bushmaster
1440	Pts leave for KAIA
1530	Arrive KAIA

Timeline of Events 05.08.14

Time	Event	NOTE
1205	Pt 1 brought in by Maj General, informed more casualties on route (b)(6) went to EFl to get boys (b)(6) went to REME (b)(6) phoned Ops Treatment started on pt 1	
1207	Pt 2,3,4,5,6 brought to MTF (b)(6) phoned Ops requesting air and confirm arrival of CAT A's	
1208	Pt 7, Pt 8 brought to MTF REME and AQ arrive	
1209	Pts 9, 10 and 11 brought to MTF	
1210	Pt 12 brought to MTF	
1212	Pt 13 brought to MTF	
1218	Pt 14 brought to MTF	
1220	Pt 15 brought to MTF	
1225	(b)(6) take pt 3 to HLS on Ridgeback	
1227	(b)(6) and pt 2 to HLS on quad (b)(6) and pt 7 to HLS on quad	
1230	Pt 16 at MTF	
1232	(b)(6) and Pt 8 on quad to HLS Pt 11 with Danish Medic on quad to HLS (b)(6) and pt 13 on Ridgeback to HLS	
1235	1st round of helicopters depart - pts 2,3,7,8,11, 13 onboard to BAF (b)(6) and pt 5 to HLS in Ridgeback then returned to MTF on quad to get replen	(b)(6) remain in MTF
1237	(b)(6) and pts 1, 4, 8,12, 14 taken to HLS in Bushmaster PMV	
1245	Pt 17 arrived from Northern HLS	
1257	(b)(6) and pt 9 on quad with replen then returned MTF	
1304	pt 17 Declared dead	
1307	(b)(6) arrived HLS with HeartStart then returned MTF	
1315	(b)(6) and pt 16 on quad to HLS	
1320	2nd round of helicopters depart pts 15, 16, 17 onboard to BAF	Unsure of arrival time of pt 15 to HLS Was in Bushmaster
1322	(b)(6) and pts 1,4,8,12,14 return to MTF in Bushmaster	(b)(6) remained at HLS with Force Protection
1325	(b)(6) return to MTF on Quad	
1330	(b)(6) and pts 1,4,6,12,14 return to HLS in Bushmaster, informed helicopter in 30 minutes	
1400	Ops room call MTF to inform of change of plan to road move to KAIA R2e	
1410	(b)(6) informed to join road move	
1420	(b)(6) joined Bushmasters at NEP reorganisation of patients: pts 1, 13 in and (b)(6) in one Bushmaster pts 4,6,14 and (b)(6) in the other Bushmaster	
1440	Pts leave for KAIA	
1530	Arrive KAIA	
Next 24 hours	4 further minor casualties seen in MTF, one CAT C reviewed	

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Guardian Angel Mission Training Plan

29 November 2012
(v14)



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Overall classification is
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CJTF-1, CJ3 – Force Protection

Classified by: Multiple Sources
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A note from the Commanding General Regional Command-East and CJTF-1



"The threat of insider attacks not only poses a risk to the safety of our personnel, and if not effectively countered, has the potential to undermine the trust and confidence between our Coalition Forces and host nation counterparts. We must remain stalwart in protecting against the insider threat, and safeguard the tactical and operational mission in support of our mission."

WILLIAM C. MAYVILLE
Major General, United States Army
Commander, RC(E)/CJTF-1



Guardian Angel Mission Training Plan

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Preface

- 1. Applicability:** This mission training plan (MTP) is for all members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) across Regional Command – East (RC-E) and CJTF-1.
- 2. Purpose:** This MTP provides commanders and leaders at all levels a descriptive, mission-oriented training program to train and implement the Guardian Angel (GA) concept as an additional layer of security to existing force protection measures. GA is only a part of much larger preventative strategy. Force protection postures and measures should constantly be assessed and changed to keep the threat unbalanced.
- 3. Discussion:** Although a unit's missions and deployment assignments impact on the commander's training priorities, the tasks described herein are the primary ones the unit must be able to execute with proficiency. The unit is expected to train all tasks to standard. Standards for training may be increased, but may not be lowered.
- 4. Authority:** The proponent for this publication is CJTF-1, CJ3 – Force Protection. Submit questions or recommendations for improving this publication to the POCs listed on the RC(E)/CJTF-1 Centrix portal at <http://rceast.afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil/fc/fp/default.aspx>.



Chapter 1 CONCEPT

1. **Definition:** The Guardian Angel (GA) is one or more individuals of a team or unit who performs duties similar to a PSD (personal security detail), and are required for all activities and locations where non-Coalition Force (CF) personnel are present. This is further defined in the next paragraph.
2. The GA must be conducted as a principle duty, and covered in the plans and orders of Partnered or Advise-Assist activities; see para. 2.2 (a) for defined locations.
3. Guardian Angels do not replace requirements for guard forces, sentries, 'battle-buddy' teaming or any other standard security measure. And are not to be confused with guards/sentries conducting duties in support of Coalition Force primary gathering facilities (gymnasium, place of worship, conference center, dining facility, etc).
4. Guardian Angel activities should be conducted without jeopardizing the trust and confidence of the host nation forces. The risks and situation will determine the method for conducting GA; but consideration to the host nation force relationships may determine the means.
5. Guardian Angels will conduct their duties with a weapon readiness posture of 'RED' regardless of the battle dress uniform state. (see [CJTF-1 Policy Letter #45](#), FRAGO 241, dtd 23 NOV 12).
6. Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns in this publication do not refer exclusively to male personnel.



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.1 Four Types of Inside the Wire Attacks

- a. **Co-option** - occurs when an existing host nation force member is recruited to assist or act on behalf of the insurgency
- b. **Infiltration** – transpires when an existing insurgent member clandestinely joins the host nation force through the standard recruitment process in order to support the insurgency
- c. **Impersonation** – occurs when an insurgent poses as a host nation force member to conduct attacks
- d. **Personal** – is defined by the host nation force member acting intentionally yet independently as an individual perpetrator

2.2 Principles

- a. **Types of Locations:** The process and procedure for implementing Guardian Angels (GA) will be impacted by the types of locations an activity is occurring at. There are three different kinds of locations with relation to GA implementation (See also References for [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 FRAGO 277](#), Attachments 2-9):
 - (1) **Coalition Force (CF) locations.** CF units only; Restricted access for host nation forces; and Constraints for host nation personnel to carry weapons and/or ammunition. In this case the GA is not required; internal security and escorts can be utilized to increase observation and immediate response requirements.
 - (2) **Partnered locations.** CF and host nation forces co-located, but are physically separated between sites; Controlled access for host nation forces onto the CF location; and Constraints for host nation personnel to carry weapons and/or ammunition on the CF fixed site/location. Due to the close proximity and frequent interaction with host nation forces, the GA is required for all Partnered activities where CF personnel are located outside of the CF location.
 - (3) **Advise-Assist locations.** A host nation only location, where CF do not reside but are present in support of mission-specific tasks; Unrestricted access for host nation forces; and No constraints for host nation personnel to carry weapons and/or ammunition. Under these circumstances, some or all, the GA will be implemented at all times for CF personnel.



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.2 Principles, Con't

- b. Personnel Selection:** Selected Guardian Angel (GA) personnel will be dependent upon the composition, size and purpose of the unit.
- (1) A minimum of one GA is required; but the commander will determine the need for additional GAs in accordance with mission requirements and conditions- location and threat assessment.
 - (2) Guardian Angel personnel should be deliberately selected and trained in accordance with the event, consideration to the mission activity (KLE or Partnered activity), and sensitivity to cultural and political conditions (i.e. Females for FET, women's medical facilities, religious leaders, etc).
 - (3) The GA personnel will not perform any other duties while executing GA,
 - (4) Guardian Angels must be focused and vigilant throughout the tasked mission or operation. Changes of assigned GA personnel are to be coordinated IOT provide security fidelity and continuity. Consideration should be given to change/rotate GAs to avoid loss of focus and effectiveness.
 - (5) Dedicated Security Forces (SECFOR) elements being assigned to Advise-Assist Teams will provide a neutral source for GA personnel selection. This will significantly minimize concerns for jeopardizing partner relationships, or reducing and adversely impacting Advisor capacity/capability.
 - (6) In circumstances where teams (SFAAT, PRT, ADT, etc) do not have a dedicated security force (SECFOR), all team members should be trained to perform GA duties in preparation for this situation.
 - (7) Guardian Angel selection within the Advise-Assist Team is dependent upon the ability of team members to serve as GAs, without jeopardizing the trust and confidence of the host nation forces.



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.3 Training

- a. **Method.** There are four primary phases where deploying units, and their Guardian Angel (GA) personnel, will be trained:
- (1) **Pre-Deployment Training:** Guardian Angel personnel are identified before deployment, and are able to capitalize on opportunities at home-station and their consolidated training center rotation. This training offers the earliest opportunity for small-unit team-building, SOP development, and rehearsals.
 - (2) **Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integrations (RSOI):** Units will use this opportunity to train and implement GA skills, and continue refining unit Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOPs), and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). National RSOI packages should be used to reinforce COMISAF's Insider Threat Tactical Directive, and confirm that personnel are aware of Theater Insider Threat policy.
 - (3) **RIP/TOA:** Inbound units should immediately incorporate assigned GA personnel in RIP-TOA activities IOT maximize opportunity to understand best practices, lessons learned and TTPs from the departing unit. These actions will enable a more effective transition into their operating environment (OE).
 - (4) **Sustainment Training:** As operational conditions change and units become more familiar with their environment, the need or desire to integrate new team members, or designate new GA personnel will require continuous GA training. Units are responsible for conducting sustainment GA training every three months, at a minimum, in addition to Theater-prescribed Insider Threat sustainment training.



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.3 Training (Continued)

b. Requirements:

- (1) Guardian Angel (GA) training will occur at all levels, and is required in support of all activities and locations where non-Coalition Force (CF) personnel are present during Partnered or Advise-Assist activities.
- (2) The GA will be trained to perform tasks in an overt or covert manner; effectively mitigating identified risks without jeopardizing the mission or trust/confidence of host nation forces.
- (3) The GA must be prepared to immediately defeat an attack, or react to an imminent attack against the personnel being safeguarded.
- (4) Guardian Angels should avoid direct interaction with non-CF personnel, but must be prepared to mitigate an emerging threat by conducting non-lethal escalation of force (EoF) actions.
- (5) Guardian Angels will be located where they can best counter a possible insider threat (IT) posed by non-CF personnel (i.e. Establish points of dominance).
- (6) Guardian Angels must be trained to critically assess threats, and employ measures to safeguard assigned personnel. (i.e. Entry/egress points, obstacles, clear lines of sight, etc).
- (7) All Guardian Angels will conduct their duties with a weapon readiness posture of 'RED' regardless of the battle dress uniform state. (See [CJTF-1 Policy Letter #45](#), FRAGO 241, dtd 23 NOV 12).



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.3 Training (Continued)

- c. **Essential Tasks:** The following tasks are essential to the success of the Guardian Angel (GA) task/mission:
- (1) **Cultural Awareness.** Conduct GA duties without unnecessarily jeopardizing relationships with host nation forces.
 - (2) **Insider Threat Mitigation.** Successfully identify Insider Threat (IT) indicators and appropriately act to mitigate or eliminate the threat. (Reference the COMISAF Insider Threat Tactical Directive)
 - (a) **Identification.** CF badging of LNs & other non-CF personnel; Host Nation badging/IDs; Host Nation forces uniform and rank identification.
 - (b) **Language Training.** Proficient on the familiarization with host nation forces 'key' words/phrases, in order to increase effectiveness toward safeguarding personnel. The unit should employ their cultural advisor or linguist to assist the GA in identifying these key phrases. (Ref. to Chapter 4.6 for examples of key words and phrases).
 - (c) **EoF Training.** Neutralize an emerging/existing threat by conducting non-lethal EoF (See References, [ISAF SOP 373](#)).
 - (d) **Establish point of dominance.** Locate/position the GA where best able to counter the Insider Threat (IT).
 - (e) **Risk mitigation measures.** Critically assess threats and employ measures to safeguard assigned personnel (i.e. Entry/egress points, obstacles, lines of sight).
 - (3) **Commo.** Proficient in the utilization and able to effectively communicate across the team and to higher in support of critical activities (e.g. QRF, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC, etc)
 - (4) **Weapons.** Proficient with personal primary and secondary weapons in close quarters marksmanship, and distance target acquisition and identification.



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.4 Equipping

- a. Personnel trained and assigned Guardian Angel (GA) duties, must be adequately equipped to support the Fundamental and perform tasks effectively:
- (1) **Weapons:** Individually assigned weapon (rifle &/or pistol) w/prescribed combat basic load for each weapon. Automatic weapons, such as the M249 (SAW) will not be used as a GA weapon.
 - (2) **Communications Equipment:** FM/HF portable personal radio systems with hand-mic and earpiece; and one alternate means of communication i.e. ICOM radio or cell phone. Additional power sources should also be carried/readily available for each device.
 - (3) **Personal Protection Equipment (PPE):** PPE will be worn in its entirety at all times while conducting GA duties both indoors and outdoors in order to provide maximum protection and the ability to carry required equipment. Exceptions to uniform posture is authorized at the discretion of the authorized commander, and reflected in the Commander's Risk Assessment. NOTE: regardless of the donned battle dress uniform state (ref. CJTF-1 Policy Letter #45, FRAGO 241 dtd 23 NOV12), the GA duty will always be conducted with a weapon readiness posture of 'RED' (Weapon State 'ROMEO' IAW HQ ISAF SOP 331).



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.5 Rules of Engagement (ROE)

- a. **BLUF:** An actual attack need not take place for the Guardian Angel (GA) to respond. It is the holistic view of the situation that the GA detects, both positive and negative factors. If a reasonable person, armed with the information and experience of that specific GA at that same point in time would have believed hostile intent existed, then their determination of HI does not violate the ROE.
- b. **Baseline:** Self-Defense is authorized anytime there is a Hostile Act or Hostile Intent exhibited against ISAF elements, and time and circumstances do not permit de-escalation. Coalition Forces (CF) must react to the CONDUCT of an individual, rather than their status. Therefore, just knowing someone is a member of the INS (without them being pre-approved for the use of force under ROE 429 (JPEL target)) is NOT enough to engage. That individual must be demonstrating a hostile intent or a hostile act for it to be permissible to engage under self-defense authority.
- c. **Hostile Intent (HI)** is the threat of imminent use of force against Coalition Forces, or specially designated person or property. It also can include the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission. Although imminence is a factor, it need not be immediate, instantaneous or overwhelming. The standard on whether HI exists is based upon an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to the forces or individual at the time of the incident, and this decision may be made at any level.
- d. **Legal basis.** A Coalition Force member may legally employ force in advance of an attack, at the point when (1) evidence shows that the aggressor has committed itself to an armed attack, and (2) delaying a response would hinder the defender's ability to amount a meaningful defense.
- e. **Proportional Response in Self-defense.** The use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstration of hostile intent. Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the *nature, duration and scope of force should not exceed what is required.* *Fires in self-defense must be limited to the degree, intensity and duration necessary for neutralization of the enemy threat.
- f. **De-escalation.** When time and circumstances permit, the forces committing HA/HI should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions.



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.6 Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

- i. **Hostile Intent (HI) Factors to Consider.** Each of the following factors are not in themselves, HI; ALL facts and circumstances must be considered:
- (1) Must demonstrate clear and substantial threat
 - (2) Individuals armed; crew-served weapons (not in itself HI). *NOTE: Many Civilians in AFG carry weapons and may be permitted to do so under law.*
 - (3) Location in relation to insurgent activity and historical attacks
 - (4) Intelligence indicating an impending attack; presence of intel collectors/informants
 - (5) Maneuvering tactically (not just walking quickly or running from forces). *NOTE: Many Civilians will run from ISAF due to desire to avoid injury and stay away from kinetic action.*
 - (6) Likelihood of attack on Coalition Forces
 - (7) Time of activity (day or night)
 - (8) Reaction of potential targets; reaction of other individuals in the vicinity to actions of the person exhibiting HI
 - (9) Maneuvering into weapons launch positions
 - (10) Locked doors, blocked escapes, efforts to disarm Soldiers or maneuver/reposition weapons



Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS

2.6 Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

- a. ISAF ROE 421-424 is followed by other ISAF forces to provide use of force authorizations in self-defense situations.
- b. Inherent Right of Self-Defense, as defined by CJCSI 3121.01B: Unit Commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their unit. Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other Coalition Forces in the vicinity.
- c. Hostile Act, as defined by CJCSI 3121.01B: An attack or other use of force against Coalition Forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of Coalition Forces, including the recovery of personnel or vital ISAF property.
- d. Hostile Intent, as defined by CJCSI 3121.01B: The threat of imminent use of force against the Coalition Forces or other designated person or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of Coalition Forces, including the recovery of personnel or vital ISAF property.
- e. Imminent Use of Force: The determination of whether the use of force against Coalition Forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to CF at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.
- f. When operating under self-defense, Coalition must react to the CONDUCT of an individual, rather than their status. Therefore, just knowing someone is a member of the INS (without them being pre-approved for the use of force under ROE 429 (JPEL target)) is not enough to engage. That individual must be demonstrating a hostile intent or a hostile act for it to be permissible to engage under self-defense authority. That is, regardless of the individual's status – civilian, combatant, or protected person – his conduct in firing on you renders him a legitimate target without the necessity of determining his status.



Chapter 3

FACTORS

3.1 Cultural Awareness

- a. It is a fact that some host nation forces have carried out insider attacks based on personal grievances; particularly with regards to perceived culturally insulting behavior by the Coalition Forces (CF). Confrontations can occur due to CF ignorance or lack of understanding/empathy for host nation cultural norms. Coalition Force actions that may lead to a confrontation include:
- (1) Failure to respect the host nation religion, religious items or facilities.
 - (2) Failure to respect the privacy of host nation females.
 - (3) Failure to respect host nation elders.
 - (4) Ethnocentrism (the belief in the superiority of one's own culture) by Coalition Force members.
 - (5) Affronts to an individual's honor (perceived or actual).
- b. Guardian Angels should be knowledgeable in the understanding of [Insider Threat through the Host Nation Optic](#). (See References)

3.2 Atmospherics

a. Media and Insider Threat

- (1) Host Nation and western media coverage of insider attacks has been steady and consistent since the War on Terror began. This type of coverage will follow any new events that occur. Host Nation media focuses on details surrounding the events and statements from high-level Coalition Force & Host Nation officials. Western media focuses on the strategic impact and implications these attacks have in regards to the pending Coalition Force withdrawal.
- (2) "Insider attacks are a tragic part of every war. But in this war, they are occurring with greater frequency than in the past. I believe that we can and will counter this threat with these efforts. Still deeper partnerships, still deeper integration -- those are the responses that will frustrate the enemy's designs to capitalize on this problem," U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, 10 Oct 2012, Military.com
- (3) "I talked with U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, I told him to respect our culture -- the things you are doing not incites the enemy but also incites me and my soldiers and the president. The enemy has only 20 percent infiltration inside our forces, the remaining 80 percent is the cause of disrespect to our culture and religion," Afghan Defense Minister Bismillah Mohammadi, 25 Sept 2012, Tolo News.



Chapter 3 FACTORS

3.2 Atmospherics (continued)

- b. **Situational Awareness:** Soldiers and leaders must strive to maintain situational awareness and understanding of all current internal and external threats through the use of digital and analogue communications to leverage information gathered from higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- c. **Indicators of violent behavior.** Violent behaviors are often displayed before an Insider Threat (IT) attack occurs. Guardian Angels (GA) must be fully cognisant of these factors and be actively searching for them at all times. Observable indicators are broken down into three categories.
- (1) **Category I** indicators should be closely monitored. Category I indicators include but are not limited to:
- (a) Complaints about other nations and/or religions
 - (b) Advocates violence beyond what is the accepted norm
 - (c) Abrupt behavioural shift
 - (d) Desires control
 - (e) Socially withdraws in some occasions
 - (f) Appears frustrated with partnered nations
 - (g) Experiences personal crisis
 - (h) Demonizes others
 - (i) Lacks positive identity with unit or country
 - (j) Reclusive
 - (k) Strange habits
 - (l) Peculiar discussions
- (2) **Category II** indicators should be referred to counter intelligence (CI) and the chain of command. Category II indicators include but are not limited to:
- (a) Verbally defends radical groups and or ideologies
 - (b) Speaks about seeking revenge
 - (c) Associates with persons who have extremist beliefs
 - (d) Exhibits intolerance
 - (e) Personally connected to a grievance
 - (f) Cuts ties with unit, family, or friends
 - (g) Isolates self from unit members
 - (h) Intense ideological rhetoric
 - (i) Attempts to recruit others
 - (j) Choice of questionable reading materials in personal areas



Chapter 3 FACTORS

3.2 Atmospherics (continued)

- (3) **Category III** indicators requires immediate action, such as removing weapon or detention as a last resort. Category III indicators include but are not limited to:
- (a) Advocates violence as a solution to problems
 - (b) Takes suspicious travel or unauthorized absences
 - (c) Stores or collects ammunition or other items that could be used to injure or kill multiple personnel
 - (d) Verbal hatred of partner nation
 - (e) Exhibits sudden interest in partner nation headquarters or individual living quarters
 - (f) Makes threatening gestures or verbal threats

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MISSION PLANNING and PREPARATION

4.1 Guardian Angel Checklist

"Guardian Angel" Checklist	YES	NO
Ensure that the 'Guardian Angel' concept is practiced at all times.		
Are 'Guardian Angels' inconspicuous in the presence of host nation forces, and non-offensive in demeanor?		
Are 'Guardian Angels' first in and last out of event locations?		
Are participating personnel made aware of the 'Guardian Angel' presence and aware of obstructing fields of fire?		
Do participants run through emergency situation scenarios to coordinate reactions?		
Is the 'buddy system' used when team members travel?		
Is there a check-in/check-out procedure for accountability?		
Are all team members carrying loaded weapons while on duty?		
Are weapons, ammunition and communications kept on personnel at all times?		
Do individual team members maintain situational awareness at all times, especially during any interaction with host nation forces?		
Do you designate 'Guardian Angels' prior to host nation force engagements or events?		
Do you ensure that 'Guardian Angels' are not principal participants in events so they can better observe interactions between CF/host nation forces?		
Are there a minimum of two 'Guardian Angels' (interior and exterior) assigned for each event?		
Do 'Guardian Angel' personnel have primary and alternate means of communication to personnel security detail (PSD, quick reaction force (QRF), movement, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)?		
Are all QRF and MEDVAC communication frequencies pre-programmed into all communication means such as radios and telephones?		
Are rehearsals and/or battle drills conducted prior to events with unit participants and designated 'Guardian Angels'?		
Are room layouts pre-briefed outlining cover and escape routes?		
Does your unit have established written procedures codified in rehearsals, battle drills and included in tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) regarding 'Guardian Angel' tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)?		
Soldiers being over watched by their Guardian Angels should also maintain about 5m separation (where possible) and move every 45 to 120 seconds. Don't bunch up in view of the host nation forces.		
Always wear 100% of your PPE, except when directed otherwise by your leadership.		



MISSION PLANNING and PREPARATION

4.2 Rehearsals

- a. **Definition:** A *rehearsal* is a session in which an element practices expected actions to improve performance during execution.
- (1) Rehearsing actions before execution allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to translate the written plan into visual impression. This impression helps orient the participants to their environment. Moreover, the repetition of required tasks during the rehearsal leaves a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. (FM 6.0, Appendix F)
 - (2) The Guardian Angel rehearsal is critical to establishing the coordination of personnel, resources, communications and enablers.
 - (3) Critical tasks associate with the mission must be rehearsed, and at a minimum include:
 - (a) Communications checks with all systems.
 - (b) Scenarios that employ the use of "stress words" &/or distress signals to trigger actions and battle drills.
 - (c) Essential Tasks lists in Chapter 2.31c.(2) [Insider Threat Mitigation](#).

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MISSION PLANNING and PREPARATION

4.3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

- SITUATION:** A KLE/meeting at a host nation force's location
METHOD: One individual is designated as the GA per meeting room. If multiple, one-on-one meetings are taking place, all personnel are briefed on an 'Alamo' plan and know designated positions if an Insider Threat occurs. Two individuals move between the meeting rooms to ensure the requisite security posture is being maintained, and to monitor host nation force personnel throughout the immediate area. GAs remain in full kit with their primary weapon, but are discretely present. Advisors can remove their PPE while conducting this activity.
- SITUATION:** A KLE with host nation forces at a village or governmental shura
METHOD: CF personnel maintain disciplined dispersion but remain within sight of the GA; minimizing the casualty producing footprint/area. The PL or PSG conduct checks among the CF personnel to ensure the requisite security posture and monitor host nation force personnel in the immediate area. If possible, CF have a SECFOR element on elevated positions to maintain situational awareness throughout the immediate as well as the surrounding area. GAs remain in PPE with their primary weapon, but act in a non-hostile manner. Advisors will downgrade their PPE posture only when the area is reported secure, and only while conducting a KLE/meeting indoors with their host nation counterparts.
- SITUATION:** Conducting a KLE at a CF location
METHOD: All CF personnel will have their assigned weapon present but in an 'Amber' status. The local command will determine whether to permit the senior ranking host nation force personnel to remain armed (with ammo); however, no armed (with ammo) host nation force PSD will be permitted.
- SITUATION:** Instructing host nation forces at a host nation force location
METHOD: All CF personnel will have their assigned weapon present but in a 'Red' status; the decision to remain in PPE is the discretion of the senior CF leader. However, a minimum of two CF pax will assume the responsibility of executing GA duties; maintaining local and area situational awareness.
- SITUATION:** Providing individual medical aid or other types of assistance to host nation forces
METHOD: All CF personnel will have GA coverage outside a CF location when rendering routine and/or immediate medical care, or for example, vehicle recovery. Providing such assistance on a CF fixed site is preferred to mitigate isolation and vulnerability.



MISSION PLANNING and PREPARATION

4.4 Best Practices from the Field (BSO/BSI/SFAAT)

1. **All advisors move with guardian angels.** The guardian angel always has at least an M4 and a radio to maintain communications with the command post on the CF fixed site.
2. **Guardian angels concentrate on securing the advisor and not on the conversation at hand.** For example: when in a counterpart's office, the guardian angel is in the best position to cover the entry points to the room (doors and windows).
3. **Guardian angels are permitted to drink chai as to not offend the host nation counterpart.**
4. **Employ BSO/BSI provided SECFOR personnel as GAs whenever possible.** Use them as primary GAs for a number of reasons, but mainly because they do not have an advisory role, and are not distracted by the host nation forces. They are usually similar in rank to the host nation force PSDs
5. **Guardian angels are not always required during meetings** when the CF Advisor meets with his counterpart on the CF fixed site. This technique also helps build rapport because it reciprocates the hospitality the host nation force counterpart provides to the CF advisor on a daily basis.
6. **Employ Guardian Angels as a part of our overarching force protection plan.**
7. **Guard against viewing the Guardian Angel concept (GA) as an overarching fix to the insider attack problem.** The truth is, GAs must be a small part of much larger preventative strategy.
8. **Force protection posture should constantly be assessed and changed.** This includes not setting patterns, planning and rehearsing contingency plans, communicating, and necessary application of lethal force.
9. **The GA should be an integral part of a much larger plan.** While force protection is imperative it is also necessary to address causal issues like host nation Soldier morale, cross cultural understanding, etc
10. **Avoid exacerbating cultural differences.** An unnecessarily armed GA will only serve to alienate your host nation counterparts and undermine trust. Not to mention, an armed individual standing guard will prevent little if the attacker is willing to die.
11. **Rational people are deterred by an alert armed guard,** but if you assume that your attacker will be rational then you are already behind the curve. In most insider attack situations the best you can hope for is to stop the attack as soon as it happens thereby limiting the effects. From the enemy's point of view, a one for one exchange is a success for an insider attack.



MISSION PLANNING and PREPARATION

4.4 Best Practices from the Field

12. **Focus on relationship building, not posting a guard.** If you are truly friends with your counterparts then you are more likely to be warned about any known plan to attack you.
13. **“If you get attacked, don’t let it be your fault.”** Diligently focus on avoiding personal grievances.
14. **Keep your emotions in check.** The tendency to become emotionally tied to the success and failures of your counterpart is high, but you must guard against emotional responses. Often that means walking away or letting a wrong go, but it does not mean that you always agree.
15. **Post a GA with the host nation PSD if your counterpart has a PSD.** Most have them, so let your counterpart know that the GA is your PSD and you are required to have one. The host nation forces are military, they understand that you have to follow orders.
16. **Utilize the SECFOR as the primary GA element during all combat operations and most outdoor engagements.**
17. **Use a more passive approach in meetings.** Counterparts are often unarmed in meetings, so the posture need not appear aggressive.
18. **Assign one officer in the room as the GA.** Even in a situation where there is no “sentry”. They do not take notes or otherwise participate in the meeting. His sole purpose is security and is positioned where he could best provide it and not commit a cultural offense. Depending on the situation a GA could also be posted outside the meeting room.
19. **Never travel in less than a three man element** while on the host nation force’s fixed site or while on patrol. During breakout sessions, three to five man teams conduct advisor operations in different locations.
20. **Teams consist of a GA, advisor, note taker, and interpreter.** This gives the appearance of team integrity, not a heightened security posture. Each group stays together and works as a fire team in the event of an insider attack.
21. **Everyone should be armed and ready to defend themselves at all times.** It is easy to get lax if there is a guy standing in the corner with shades on, but strive to defeat such complacency.
22. **Train pistol proficiency.** Not all team members are experienced with a pistol.
23. **Use AARs and debriefs to improve TTPs and effectiveness of security.**
24. **The GA duty should be conducted with weapons in RED Status;** (Weapon State ROMEO IAW HQ ISAF SOP 331).



MISSION PLANNING and PREPARATION

4.5 Language Training

a. **Training sources:** Language training should begin at home station and continue throughout the deployment cycle. The on-line resources below will further development of language skills: .

1. RAPPORT: <http://rapport.lingnet.org>
2. Language and Culture Training: <http://dlidev.lingnet.org.alct>
3. <https://www.atrrs.army.mil> to register for specific courses.

b. **Training application:** As a Guardian Angel, being proficient on familiarization with host nation forces 'key' words/phrases will increase effectiveness toward safeguarding personnel. A Guardian Angel may be required to give direction, or ask questions from individuals who approach the personnel the GA is assigned to protect. The basic words and commands listed below will assist in the implementation of the GA duties.

BASIC WORDS AND COMMANDS		
English	Dari	Pashtu
hello	salaam	as-salaamu 'alaykum
no	ney	na
yes	baley	ho
stop	draysh	drezh
Stop or I'll shoot!	draysh aga nay faeer maykounum!	Drezh yaa za daz kawarm!
Hands up.	destaa baalaa	Laasuna porta
hands down	destaa paayeen	Lasuna kshata
Turn around.	daor bukhou	Shaa garzd
Lie down.	prout kou	Prot
Put your weapon down.	salaaeeta pertou	Khpala wasla kshezhdai
Stay there.	oonja beash	Halta paata sai.
Move.	arakat kou	Dzai
Where are you going?	kujaa mayrayn?	Taase cheri dszi?
What do you want?	chee maykhoyayn?	Taaseghwaarai?
Who are you?	keestayr?	Taase tsok yaast?
Do you have ID?	tazkira (kard-ay hoohat) daarayn?	Taase peshand paana larai?
Do you have weapons?	salsa daarayn?	Taase wasla larai?
Can I see your papers?	Maytaanum asnaadaitouna bebeenum?	Za staase asnaad katalai sam?
We must search you.	maa beayad shumaara talashee konaym.	Muzh taase talaashi kawu.

UNCLASSIFIED // ~~FOUO~~



Guardian Angel

Tasks, Conditions, Standards



Task, Conditions, and Standards

TASK 1: Conduct Guardian Angel (GA) Duties in support of partnered operations or Advise-Assist activities with host nation forces.

CONDITION: The CF element/unit may be either on or off the CF fixed-site/base with host nation forces, and an Insider Threat (IT) exists against CF personnel. Standard security measures are being executed.

STANDARD: The Guardian Angel(s) will ensure no harm occurs to the CF individual or personnel being safeguarded, as a result of non-CF personnel physical presence. All CF partnered operations &/or Advise-Assist activities will employ GAs as long as an IT exists.

GA TASK-2 STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The GA completed an IT Risk Assessment before the operation/activity with host nation forces. Risks are mitigated and addressed in the plans, orders & mission briefs/rehearsals. 2. The GA is in the Battle Dress Uniform state prescribed by RC(E)/CJTF-1 Policy-45, corresponding to the required weapon readiness posture 'Red'. Exceptions to the uniform state are approved by a minimum of an O-5/OF-4 Commander. 3. The GA demonstrates effective communications with primary and secondary commo capabilities; to the SECFOR element or QRF, and MEDEVAC at a minimum. 4. The GA demonstrates proficiency to PID Host Nation badging/IDs; uniform and rank identification. 5. The GA demonstrates the trained ability to position himself where he can best counter a possible Insider Threat (IT) posted by non-CF personnel (point of dominance). 6. The GA demonstrates trained ability to critically assess threats, and employ measures to safeguard assigned personnel (i.e. entry/egress points, obstacles, lines of sight). 		



Task, Conditions, and Standards

TASK 2: Conduct Guardian Angel (GA) Duties in support of partnered operations or Advise-Assist activities with host nation forces.

GA TASK-2 STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES (cont'd)	GO	NO-GO
7. The GA demonstrates the trained ability to perform duties/tasks overtly & covertly (mission dictated), in order to effectively mitigate identified risks without jeopardizing the mission or trust/confidence of host nation forces.		
8. The GA avoids direct interaction with non-CF personnel, but demonstrates the ability to neutralize an emerging threat by conducting non-lethal escalation of force (EoF) actions.		
9. The GA demonstrated the trained ability to immediately defeat an attack, or react to an imminent attack against the personnel being safeguarded.		

TASK PERFORMANCE / EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK							
ITERATION	1	2	3	4	5	6	TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED							
TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO"							
TRAINING STATUS "GO"/"NO-GO"							

SUPPORTING COLLECTIVE TASKS		
TASK NUMBER	TASK TITLE	REFERENCE

SUPPORTING INDIVIDUAL TASKS		
TASK NUMBER	TASK TITLE	REFERENCE



References

- a. [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 Insider Threat Working Group, Chaired by CJ39 \(RCC\)](#)
- b. [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 FRAGO 277, Change-2, Vulnerability Assessments, dated 27 OCT 12](#)
- c. [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 FRAGO 324, Change-1, Insider Threat Mitigation](#)
- d. [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 FRAGO 430, Additional Security Measures to Mitigate Insider Threat, dated 19 SEP 12](#)
- e. [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 FRAGO 433, Guardian Angel Protection for Unarmed Civilian Contractors, dated 19 SEP 12](#)
- f. [RC\(E\)/CJTF-1 FRAGO 485, Insider Threat Risk Assessment, dated 01 OCT 12](#)
- g. [IJC FRAGO 359-2012, Joint Casualty Assessment Team \(JCAT\) & Force on Force Reporting Requirements, dated 11 AUG 12](#)
- h. [IJC FRAGO 360-2012, Insider Threat Mitigation, dated 11 AUG 12](#)
- i. [IJC FRAGO 424-2012, Additional Security Measures to Mitigate Insider Threat, dated 16 SEP 2012](#)
- j. [COM ISAF Insider Threat Tactical Directive, dated 2 MAR 12](#)
- k. [HQ ISAF FRAGO 054-2012, Enduring Force Protection Measures for Individuals and Small Groups for ISAF and USFOR-A Personnel at GIRoA, ANSF and other Non-ISAF fixed sites, dated 10 MAR 12](#)
- l. [HQ ISAF FRAGO 108-2012, Establishment of Guardian Angel Protection for Unarmed Civil Contractors, dated 16 JUN 12](#)
- m. [HQ ISAF FRAGO 139-2012, Counter Insider Threat Immediate Measures, dated 11 AUG 12](#)
- n. [ISAF Security Classification Guide, dated 12 FEB 10](#)
- o. [HQ ISAF SOP 231, Theater Installation Access and Security Badging, dated 16 JUL 12](#)
- p. [HQ ISAF SOP 331, Theater Force Protection, dated 22 SEP 11](#)
- q. [HQ ISAF SOP 332, Countering the Inside the Wire Threat, dated 22 SEP 12](#)
- r. [HQ ISAF SOP 373, Direction and Guidance for Escalation of Force, dated 10 APR 10](#)
- s. [US Army TRADOC G2 Insider Threat Handbook Procedures, dated 14 OCT 12](#)
- t. [CSOC 390-12, Considerations for Ramazan 2012, 30 JUN 12](#)
- u. [CSOC 378-12, Religious Atmospherics Report 2012, JUN 12](#)
- v. [ADP6-0, Mission Command, Appendix F, Rehearsals](#)
- w. [CHANGE 2 TO FRAGO 433 TO CJTF-1 OPOD 12-01 IMPLEMENTATION OF GUARDIAN ANGEL FORCE PROTECTION FOR UNARMED CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS, dated 021500ZNOV12](#)
- x. [FM 3-19.12, Personal Protection, 2004 \(Go to \[www.adp.army.mil\]\(http://www.adp.army.mil\)\)](#)
- y. [Insider Threat Through the Afghan Optic, Human Terrain Analysis Team, 24 SEP 12](#)
- z. [NTMA QRD Training POI](#)



Glossary

Blue	A term used to describe Coalition Forces (CF)
CJTF-1	Combined Joint Task Force One
COMISAF	Commander of ISAF
EoF	Escalation of Force (as prescribed IAW HQ ISAF SOP)
FET	Female Engagement Team
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GA	Guardian Angel
Green	A term used to describe host nation forces
Inside the Wire	Term used to describe the area outside of a base or FOB
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	Insider Threat
Kandak	Afghan term for the equivalent of a Battalion
MTP	Mission Training Plan
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RC-E	Regional Command East
RIP	Relief in Place
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SECFOR	Security Forces
SFAAT	Security Force Assistance Advisory Team
SFAT	Security Force Assistance Team
Shura	Word for consultation or meeting
TACSOP	Tactical Standing Operating Procedures
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures



Annex 1.0

Insider Threat (IT) Mitigation Risk Assessment

(2 of 2)

CJTF-1 FRAGO 485 (Attachment-3); See References

DATE PREPARED: PREPARED BY (NAME/NUMBER):	PARTNERING ORGANIZATION(S) UNIT: PREPARED DUTY POSITION:	INITIAL RISK LEVEL (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH) <small>(Ref attached chart for example hazards)</small>	CONTROLS <small>(Ref attached chart for example controls)</small>	RMO IS IMPLEMENTING CONTROLS	MITIGATED RISK LEVEL (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH)	PARTNERED LOCATION <small>(Adjacent, Fob-in-Fob, Embedded)</small>
<p>Task: Conduct an Insider Threat Risk Assessment at partnered locations (defined as adjacent/unconnected but separated CF-ANSF fixed-sites, Fob-in-Fob construct, or Embedded (no walls/divides))</p> <p>Purpose: To aide in the awareness of insider threat indicators, and options to mitigate the risk(s).</p> <p>Method: This chart is intended for utilization by all RC(E) Coalition, GRC(A) and ANSF personnel serving in a partnered environment.</p> <p>Endstate: Generate open dialogue and build on existing trust between RC(E) coalition partners and partnered-location personnel.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Weekly Insur Threat Composite Risk Assessment</p>						
<p>Overall Risk Level After Controls are Implemented (Check Box):</p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> LOW/RISK <input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE <input type="checkbox"/> HIGH/RISK </p>						
NAME (LAST FIRST MI.)						SIGNATURE
RANK						DUTY POSITION
RISK DECISION AUTHORITY						

Page 1
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Annex 1.0 Insider Threat (IT) Mitigation Risk Assessment (2 of 2)

CJTF-1 FRAGO 485 (Attachment-3); See References

HAZARDS (Lower-risk indicators)	INITIAL RISK LEVEL	CONTROLS (Lower-risk Action / Mitigation)
Individuals consistently complains about other nations or religions Individuals advocate of violence beyond what is the acceptable norm Individuals exhibit disrupt behavior shift Individuals appear socially withdrawn, reclusive Individuals appear unusually frustrated with a partnered individual or element An individual experiences a personal crisis Individuals constantly denigrate others Individuals display strange habits, don't believe like others in his group	LOWER RISK	Clearly notify the situation and/or discuss the perceived problem (give notice resolution) with the individual(s) and report to the Situation Leader/DCP leadership. Approving authority is CD CDR or IS. There is no action to be taken until further notice that should result in consideration based on the situation and controls.
HAZARDS (Moderate-risk indicators) Unit indicators Unit has had an Insider Threat incident within the last 6 months Unit has more than 10% but less than 20% of personnel AWO There has been more than a 5% increase in AWO personnel over a 30 day period Any AWO personnel returned to unit with the last 30 days Any equipped personnel from controlled or TS controlled areas returned from leave within last 30 days Unit has more than 20% newly assigned personnel (less than 90 days) Individual indicators Individuals known or believed to be overpaid Individuals verbally defend radical groups and/or ideologies Individuals have repeatedly warned a partnered individual or element to stay away Individuals speak about seeking revenge or harming others Individuals associate with persons that have extremist beliefs Individuals exhibit intolerance Individuals are personally connected to a grievance Individuals are disconnected from unit, family and/or friends Individuals isolate themselves from unit members Individuals engage in intense ideological debates Individuals attempt to recruit others Individuals possess questionable reading material	MODERATE RISK	Refer the situation directly to the Situation Leader/DCP leadership, who will also ensure that the information is reported to an intelligence activity and processed unit. Frigate/RCF leadership will assess if partnering is to be halted or ceased. Approving authority is BN CDR or IS. There is no action taken until a week after threat result or consideration based on existing to a HIGH RISK CONTROL.
HAZARDS (High-risk indicators) Unit indicators Unit has had an Insider Threat incident within the last 90 days Unit has more than 20% of personnel AWO Any number of AWO personnel are from controlled or TS controlled districts Any AWO personnel returned to unit within last 7 days There has been more than a 5% increase in AWO personnel over a 24 day period Any assigned personnel from controlled or TS controlled areas returned from leave within last 7 days Unit has more than 20% newly assigned personnel (less than 90 days) Individual indicators Individuals advocate violence as a solution to a problem Individuals show a sudden shift from being upset to a calm demeanor Individuals participate in suspicious travel activities or unauthorized absences Individuals are reported known to store or collect ammunition or other items that can be lethal to one or many people Individuals exhibit sudden interest in a partnered individual or element Individuals make threatening gestures or verbal threats	HIGH RISK	CDR's Action by leadership only. Conduct an immediate appropriate action, detaining the individual(s) and/or removing weapons in a last resort. Notify the partnered unit. Partnering will cease until the above-DCP leadership has assessed the situation (per the mission & force). Approving authority is the BCC CDR or IS.
HAZARD (An partnered element, located at a fixed site with 14 assessed Performance Measures "No-GO") Yes: "No-GO" exist but has been temporarily mitigated until a permanent solution is achieved No mitigation to IIA vulnerabilities. If no vulnerability assessment has been conducted at all (partnered element location), then becomes a default High Risk.	HIGH RISK	CONTROLS (Action / Mitigation) Continue to improve existing vulnerability "No-GO" to lower risk Implement additional security measures where necessary to assure the force (i.e. physical access control measures, access, weapons, etc.) and/or other restrictions, etc.



Annex 2.0

RC-E (IT) Mission De-Brief Format

Suggested questions to be addressed by Guardian Angels and submitted to S2 as part of the mission information collection plan:

FACTUAL:

Size

Activity

Location:

Uniform:

Time:

Enemy:

INTANGIBLE:

Perception of rapport/threat:

1. What, if any, Friction Points were raised?
2. What changes in "climate" were noticed since the last meeting?
3. Did you witness any potentially negative actions/comments?
4. Was there an increased use of cell phones or other distractions?
5. What was different today?
6. Did anything make the hair on the back of your neck stand on end?
7. What phone numbers did you collect?

Assessment of Insider Threat Indicators:

Suggested actions to mitigate threats created by our own actions (rapport-breaking):



Guardian Angel M.I.N.D.

Move Safely

- Maintain an offensive mindset; stay aware
- Keep weapons in RED status; ready to act
- Coordinate entry and exit into meeting places
- Communicate what you see to outer security
- Always have a way out

Identify the Threat

- Look for key indicators
- Triage the room; know what right looks like
- Communicate what you see to others
- Posture yourself as a deterrent to mitigate threat
- Use FLASH words to communicate action

Neutralize the Threat:

- Maintain offensive mindset; active not reactive
- Trust your instinct and rely on muscle memory
- PID threat and react to CONDUCT not STATUS
- Secure immediate area & gain accountability (M/W/E)
- Report and wait for clearance to egress

De-Brief the Mission:

- What did you see and hear?
- Who was present, who was not?
- Share lessons learned and observations with your S2

English	Dari
hello	salaam
no	ney
yes	balay
stop	draysh
Stop or I'll shoot!	draysh aga nay faeer maykounumi!
Hands up.	desta baala
hands down	desta paayeen
Turn around.	daor bukhou
Lie down.	prout kou
Put your weapon down.	salaaeeta pertou
Stay there.	oonja beash
Move.	arakat kou
Where are you going?	kujaa mayrayn?
What do you want?	chee maykhoyayn?
Who are you?	keestayr?
Do you have ID?	tazkira (kard-oy hooah) daarayn?
Do you have weapons?	saisa daarayn?
Can I see your papers?	Maytaannum asnaadathouna bebeennum?
We must search you.	ma beeyad shunmaara talashee korayn.

Key Words and Phrases (Dari)



Guardian Angel Hip Pocket Reference

29 November 2012
(v14)



Overall classification is
UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO

CJTF-1, CJ3 – Force Protection

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on:

English	Pashtu
hello	as-salaamu 'alaykum
no	na
yes	ho
stop	drezh
Stop or I'll shoot!	Drezh yaa za daz kawami!
Hands up.	Laasuna porta
hands down	Lasuna kshata
Turn around.	Shaa garzd
Lie down.	Prot
Put your weapon down.	Khpala wasla kshezhda!
Stay there.	Halta paata sal.
Move.	Dzai
Where are you going?	Taase chert dsz?
What do you want?	Taaseghwara?
Who are you?	Taase tsok yaast?
Do you have ID?	Taase peshand paana larai?
Do you have weapons?	Taase wasla larai?
Can I see your papers?	Za stase asnaad kartalai sam?
We must search you.	Muzh tasee talaashi kawu.

Key Words and Phrases (Pashtu)





Guardian Angel: Definition

- Definition:** The Guardian Angel (GA) is one or more individuals of a team or unit who performs duties similar to a PSD (personal security detail), and are required for all activities and locations where armed Host Nation Force (HNF) personnel are present.
- The Guardian Angel must be conducted as a principle duty, and covered in the plans and orders of partnered or advise-assist activities; and conducted in support of Coalition Force primary gathering facilities to protect key individuals or small groups conducting Partnered operations.
- Guardian Angels do not replace, and must not be confused with, requirements for guard forces, sentries, 'battle-buddy' teaming or any other standard security measure. Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns in this publication do not refer exclusively to male personnel.
- Guardian Angel activities should be conducted without jeopardizing the trust and confidence of the host nation forces. The risks and situation will determine the method for conducting GA; but consideration to the host nation force relationships may determine the means.
- Guardian Angels will conduct their duties with a weapon readiness posture of 'RED' (ref. CJTF-1 Policy Letter #45), regardless of the battle dress uniform state.



After Mission De-Brief

Suggested questions to be addressed by Guardian Angels and submitted to S2 as part of the information collection plan:

FACTUAL:

Size
Activity
Location:
Uniform:
Time:
Enemy:

INTANGIBLE

- What, if any, Friction Points were raised?
- What changes in "climate" were noticed since the last meeting?
- Did you witness any potentially negative actions/comments?
- Was there an increased use of cell phones or other distractions?
- What was different today?
- Did anything make the hair on the back of your neck stand on end?
- What phone numbers did you collect?

Assessment of Insider Threat Indicators:

Suggested actions to mitigate threats created by our own actions (rapport-breaking):



Guardian Angel Checklist

	YES	NO
Ensure that the 'Guardian Angel' concept is practiced at all times.		
Are 'Guardian Angels' inconspicuous in the presence of host nation forces, and non-offensive in demeanor?		
Are 'Guardian Angels' first in and last out of event locations?		
Are participating personnel made aware of the 'Guardian Angel' presence and aware of obstructing fields of fire?		
Are all team members carrying loaded weapons while on duty?		
Are weapons, ammunition and communications kept on personnel at all times?		
Do individual team members maintain situational awareness at all times, especially during any interaction with host nation forces?		
Do you ensure that 'Guardian Angels' are not principal participants in events so they can better observe interactions between CF/host nation forces?		
Are there a minimum of two 'Guardian Angels' (interior and exterior) assigned for each event?		
Do 'Guardian Angel' personnel have primary and alternate means of communication to personnel security detail (PSD, quick reaction force (QRF), movement, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)?		
Are all QRF and MEDVAC communication frequencies pre-programmed into all communication means such as radios and telephones?		
Are rehearsals and/or battle drills conducted prior to events with unit participants and designated 'Guardian Angels'?		
Are room layouts pre-briefed outlining cover and escape routes?		
Does your unit have established written procedures codified in rehearsals, battle drills and included in tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) regarding 'Guardian Angel' tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)?		
Soldiers being over watched by their Guardian Angels should also maintain about 5m separation (where possible) and move every 45 to 120 seconds. Don't bunch up in view of the host nation forces.		



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Exhibit X20

TF 2 FURY Guardian Angel SOP



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ISAF Joint Command TF 2 Fury Guardian Angel Standards

Make it Matter



- **GA Team Responsibilities**

- Security of all ISAF and ISAF Contractors is the #1 Mission
- Open Communication with Higher HQ for duration of Mission
- In event of any hostile actions GA team will attempt to neutralize the threat and report to Higher the nature of incident and any resources needed (QRF, MEDEVAC, EOD)
- On hand medical supplies in case of injury (CLS Bag, WALK Kit, Medic Bag)
- Professional appearance and actions: Weapons are worn openly all the time, IOT treat the people with respect and honor and avoid lying on partners. Uniforms will be worn IAW AR 670-1- **No** civilian clothing is authorized for wear
- Guardian Angel social interaction with the others is best avoided but if unavoidable in certain circumstances should be limited to a minimum.



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WAR FIGHTING EQUIPMENT



- **Weapons and Night Vision Optics:**

- M249, M240, M4, M9
- LASER (PEQ-15, PEQ 15A)
- OPTICS (ACOG, M68)
- PVS 14's, PSQ 20's (thermal capability)

- **Medical Equipment**

- Aid Bags
- CLS Bags (1 per vehicle)
- Evacuation Equipment (litter, skedco and hoist equipment)
- IFAK

- **Communications Platforms:**

- DTCS Radios
- EADS
- Harris 152
- PRC 148 (MBITR)
- AN/PRC 117F (SATCOM)





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Planning and Preparation



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ISTORY OF ITEMS IN
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ENT



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Guardian Angel Contingencies



- **Contingencies that will be covered at Convoy Brief**
 - Small Arms Fire
 - VBIED
 - Down Vehicle
 - IED Exploded, Unexploded
 - Active Shooter
 - Indirect Fire
 - Traffic Accident

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Actions On





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GRG Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)



- Guardian Angel units will have a dedicated GRG for internal communications and situational awareness throughout the GA Team.
- Guardian Angels are encouraged to take pictures and develop a vulnerability assessment for buildings, entry control points (ECP) and any other significant terrain IOT increase situational awareness.
- Every member of the GA Team will have a copy of the GRG and report their current location to the Primary Security Officer (PSO) and mounted element to have the ability for flexing security as needed.
- Casualty Collection Points and Safe Havens will be reported up as they are confirmed or denied throughout the mission.

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


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
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Concept of Security



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
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Vehicle Movement on Objective



- Once Guardian Angels are dismounted; the vehicles will trail IOT provide immediate support and evacuation if needed
- Once Guardian Angels are inside a building the mounted element has the following tasks:
 - Confirm or deny entry/ egress routes to building
 - Atmospherics around building and surrounding area
 - Early warning to GA Team for suspicious activity
 - Conduct radio checks every 15 minutes
 - Maintain communications with higher headquarters
 - Battle track GA element
 - Disseminate information from higher headquarters (IE SIGACTS, threats or updates to route/ air status
- If applicable; park a building away in a covered and concealed area in order to cause a diversion in the attempt of an insider threat to create time and space to evacuate principal






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Deception Techniques






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
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CENTRAL SUPPLY DEPOT GRAPHICS




HALLWAY OF THE MENTOR BUILDING WHICH HOUSES MANY ADVISORS OF DIFFERENT NATIONS TO OVERSEE THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOGISTICS THROUGHOUT AFGHANISTAN




END OF HALLWAY IN WHICH THE MENTORS OFFICE IS LOCATED

THE ROOM IS WHERE THE ADVISORS HOLD MEETINGS AND HAVE MANY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND BASE DEFENSE PLANS ON THE WALLS



THIS STAIRCASE LEADS UPSTAIRES TO THE MENTOR BUILDING IN WHICH AS NO OTHER ENTRANCE AND EXIT AND NUMEROUS WINDOWS WITH CAN BE SEEN IN THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND



OVERVIEW OF THE MENTOR BUILDING PARKING LOT IN WHICH CF'S PARK THEIR VEHICLES MAKING IT CROWDED AND CHAOTIC IF ABORT CRITERIA HAD TO BE ENGAGED



HEADQUARTERS


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
Central Supply Depot Graphics




S/N RUNNING ROAD THAT HAS EASE OF ACCESS TO THE BUILDING; GOOD FOR QUICK EXFIL



MAIN ENTRANCE TO THE CLASS IX BUILDING IS CANTILIZING DUE TO SMALL STAIRCASE IN WHICH ALL THE PRINCIPLES LIKE TO JUST WALK UP IN A LINE. YOU CAN SEE THE STAIRCASE FROM NUMEROUS PLACES ON CSD AND IS EXPOSED OVER THE WALLS TO THE NORTH



OPEN AREA FOR THE CLASS IX STAFF HAS ALTERNATE EXIT HERE



OPEN AREA FOR THE CLASS IX STAFF



THE ROOM WHERE THE LN WORKER MAKES CHAI IS NOT VISIBLE WHILE INSIDE THE OPEN BAY. IF CONTACT WERE TO HAPPEN HERE THERE IS NOT A LOT OF COVER TO MANUEVER PRINCIPLES SAFELY OUT OF THE BUILDING.

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
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Placement of Principle



- Principles in the room should be placed away from windows and doors if at all possible
- Guardian angels will have clear and unobstructed observations of all doors and windows
- Have a quick extraction route for principles located in the room





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Small Room Meeting Norms



- **Definition**


- Small rooms are defined as a room that is not large enough for Guardian Angels to be present inside.
 - **One GA remains at the door**
 - **One GA moves to the point of domination in the hallway**

- The only people inside the room are individuals immediately involved with the meeting and their aides.

- **NO ANSF Guards inside room**

- **Communications**

- GA to GA- Visual, FM
- GA to Principle- Audible, Cell Phone



SECTORS
PRIMARY
SECONDARY



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Large Room Meeting Norms



- **Definition**

- Large enough for Guardian Angels to be inside
 - **One GA remains at the door**
 - **One GA dominates a corner near his principle that allows him full visibility of the room.**
- The only people inside the room are individuals immediately involved with the meeting and their aides.
- ANSF guards inside meeting remain **under a 3:1 ratio**
- Communications
 - GA to GA- FM
 - GA to Principle- Visual





- ANSF Guards in the room violate 3:1 ratio
- An attack on Coalition Forces in Kabul
 - IDF/ SAF/ IED in Immediate Area
- Observed or suspected hostility from local nationals
- Intel of insider threat at meeting location
- Principle expresses desire to abort

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Abort Status



Current Threat Level

- **Green-** Status Normal
- **Amber-** Suspicious activity, heightened alertness
- **Red-** Begin to extract principle
- **Black-** Immediately physically extract principle

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Train to be Protected



- Ensure principals understand your training and our purpose
- Incorporate your principals into your planning
- Encourage your principals to take the time to attend training with you.
 - IE Rehearsals before mission
- Ensure principals understand the abort criteria

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